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Abstract 
Inadequate water service provision to the urban poor remains a serious problem in 
low income countries. Utilities lack the resources, obligations or incentives for service 
expansion and there may be a long delay before water utilities are in a position to 
extend services. Non-state water providers (NSPs), including both formal and 
informal local private providers, as well as civil society institutions, play a large role 
in provision of services to the urban poor and are increasingly recognised as a 
potential effective means of service provision to the urban poor. Governments should 
seek to create a better enabling environment for utilities to overcome disincentives in 
service provision to the poor and seek more effective ways of engagement with the 
NSPs.  
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Introduction 
The historical justification for public sector involvement in water provision has been 
to ensure public health benefits, particularly for the poorest. However, the public 
water sector in low-income countries is also failing to meet the needs of the urban 
poor and in many cases has failed to achieve the goal of public health provision for 
the poor and has ended up subsidising the convenience interests of the rich. In the 
nineties there was the trend of increasing use of long term public private partnerships 
and it was widely argued that these large private operators would bring the capital for 
the much needed infrastructure to extend services to the poor. Experience shows that 
these partnerships have very mixed results and that they seem not more efficient in 
provision of services to the poor then the public sector (Prasad, 2006). Recent 
developments also show that the major multinational operators are not longer 
interested in the low income countries, where there is no guaranty for commercial 
viability of water services supply (Global Water Intelligence, 2005). 
Provision of piped water supply to the poor by a formal utility may be desired 
and considered cost-effective in the long run (due to economies of scale and 
price).However, utilities lack the resources, obligations or incentives for service 
expansion and there may be a long delay before water utilities are in a position to 
extend services (Hunt and Tremolet, 2006). In meanwhile, it is increasingly 
recognised that local non-state providers (NSPs) including both formal and informal 
private providers, as well as civil society institutions, play a large role in water service 
provision to the urban poor. These NSPs have traditionally been assigned to illegality, 
because they are often considered a temporary solution that would need to be 
eliminated once the formal utility has developed sufficiently to expand its services in 
all areas (Hunt and Tremolet, 2006).  
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In low-income countries both formal water utilities and NSPs have their 
comparative advantages and weaknesses in water services provision to the poor. In 
order to improve and make service provision affordable and to make best use of the 
scarce resources available, governments should seek to create a better enabling 
environment for utilities to overcome disincentives in service provision to the poor 
and seek more effective ways of engagement with the NSPs.  
This paper briefly analysis why current public service provision to the poor is 
failing1 and it outlines how some of these issues hampering service provision to the 
poor by the formal utility could be addressed. Given the importance of NSPs, the 
paper identifies the different forms of NSPs, it describes how effective forms of utility 
engagement can overcome disincentives in service provision to the poor by formal 
utilities, and expresses challenges in reaching the poor. 
 
Service provision to the poor by formal utilities 
Serving the urban poor with water requires the ability of a formal utility to deliver an 
inflexible, expensive, asset based service to a rapidly growing urban population of 
whom up to half are living at or below the poverty line, often in informal, ‘illegal’ 
housing areas. The water sector is facing this challenge of serving the urban poor in 
these difficult conditions. The poor performance of the public sector has been made 
worse by the rapid population growth in urban areas that would have stretched even 
the best water utilities. Average urban growth rates of 3.7 percent (POPIN, 2001) 
show that the urban population in middle and low-income countries have been 
doubling in less than twenty years. In some of the world’s poorest countries half the 
population of cities are living below official poverty levels (UNFPA, 1996). Serving 
the poor is therefore a primary, not a secondary concern. This lies at the heart of the 
challenge of providing water in urban areas but progress towards provision of water 
services to the poor seem to be hampered. What are issues that create incentives or 
disincentives for direct government providers to improve service provision to the 
poor?  
 
First issue: Often the direct provider has no mandate to serve the poor 
A large percentage of the poor population lives in informal, illegal housing areas. The 
unplanned nature of such settlements makes it harder for direct providers to supply 
water through conventional means because of perceived constraints concerning land 
tenure, space to lay pipes and the poor’s limited ability to pay. In addition, the law 
and regulations often necessitates a ban on government direct providers serving these 
illegal areas and, in doing so, regulation does not necessary provide a mandate to 
serve the poor.  
An example can be found in Zambia where the government enacted a Water 
Supply and Sanitation Act in 1997. This Act provides for the regulation of 
commercial water supply and sanitation services in the country but it does not address 
the issue of universal coverage. In other words it does not mention service provision 
to low income areas. The national government of Uganda is partly to blame for the 
low service provision to the poor, as it owns the utility and provides a legislative 
framework for service delivery. Government expects the utility to “operate on sound 
commercial practice, and ensure that its revenues are sufficient to provide for (a) all 
depreciation, amortisation and interest rates; (b) all operation and maintenance costs; 
                                                          
1 The findings are based on “Incentives for Water Utilities to serve the Urban Poor” a study undertaken 
by the Institutions and Managerial Working Group from the Water Supply and Sanitation Collaborative 
Council (Franceys and Bos eds, 2003) 
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and (c) a reasonable return on investment”. The statute under which the utility 
operates does not consider the urban poor. Since the urban poor are presumed to have 
a low affordability to pay for the full cost recovery costs, the utility has in the past 
considered such households outside ‘its official mandate’. 
 
Second issue: Creativity and innovativeness of service providers 
The private sector is assumed to be more creative and flexible than the public sector 
as they are under a much greater pressure to address the needs of the poor as this is 
stipulated in their contract. However, there are examples where public providers can 
be just as creative and innovative as private providers. Why are not all public utilities 
innovative in a solution to expand services to the poor? Publicly owned utilities, in 
their attempt to ensure the delivery of adequate services, have had to become ever 
more prescriptive in the standards that they expect, partly in an attempt to limit the 
temptations for officials to extract personal gain. As a result, middle managers know 
that they have to follow the rules and that obedience and submission to the technical 
standards is valued more highly than creativity and flexibility, particularly with regard 
to serving the illegal squatter areas. A recent study confirms that managerial 
autonomy is central to utility performance (Braadbaart, et al., 2006). 
Clearly defined guidelines and stipulation of service provision responsibilities 
set out by government, and government grants to extend services to the poor can act 
as incentives. Proscriptive rules may require to be translated in to an acceptable, 
manageable and affordable level of service. In order for this to happen the direct 
provider needs a certain level of autonomy from government control and norms. This 
is to allow the utility to be creative and innovative in their attempts to serve the poor, 
to experiment and to fail before finding the right approach in a particular setting. 
 
Third issue: The need for regulation by government. 
Central governments have to provide the legal and economic framework, requiring the 
universal service obligation whilst enabling this provision through the implementation 
of realistic tariffs, for new connections as well as for consumption. Politicians, 
whether national or municipal, have to be enabled to understand that the poor are 
served more effectively through regular price rises which achieve overall cost 
reflective pricing (Shirley, 2000). 
The government regulation in Santiago is fundamental for creating incentives 
to serve the poor. The well focused, government managed welfare subsidy provides 
this incentive, as tariffs for everyone, including the poor, are set on a realistic base 
(Komives, 2006). Also regular tariff increases do not necessary provide social 
problems for the poorer households as long as the subsidy scheme, set by government, 
helps to neutralise the tariff for the poorest. 
 
Fourth issue: Separation of direct provider and government  
Separation of the utility as the direct provider and the government as regulator is 
crucial for service extension to the poor. Incentives identified on the well focused, 
government managed welfare subsidy scheme in Santiago and the clear performance 
targets on increased service in Bolivia are real incentives because they are regulated 
and monitored by the regulator and implemented by, or with the help of, the direct 
provider.  If government is in a poacher - gamekeeper situation then it will be very 
difficult to create incentives to serve the urban poor (Foster, 1996). 
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Fifth issue: Price of water: Cross-subsidisation an incentive or disincentive? 
Whether cross subsidisation or life-line block tariffs cater for the needs of the poor is 
subject to debate. The well intended social tariff systems can create undesirable 
effects or distortions. Although the economics of water provision show that, for a 
given capacity, cost per unit of water supplied declines as water use at any connection 
rises, increasing block tariffs invert this relationship for prices. The price charged per 
unit of water supplied therefore increases in a series of blocks of monthly 
consumption. As customers consume more water such that the total demand per 
month moves above a certain limit all additional water consumed is paid for at a 
higher price per cubic metre. The argument is that increasing block tariffs allow for a 
‘lifeline block’, below the cost of supply, to ensure that basic water needs are 
affordable. The subsidy inherent in any lifeline block is then presumed to be paid for 
by the higher rate tariffs imposed on large users. This does not allow for the situation 
where poorer households, often in tenement or multi-occupancy housing, receive 
water through a single connection. In this situation, perversely, the poor end up 
paying more per unit of water than the higher-income groups (Komives, 1999). 
The extremely low tariffs for water consumption by the poor can act as a 
substantial disincentive for utilities to extend services as tariffs often do not include 
all variable costs, including the cost of metering, billing and collection. This will 
contribute to an economic loss carried by the utility. As it is not cost effective for 
utilities to meter consumption that is highly subsidised or even bill them the utility 
loses the incentive to reduce the part of unaccounted for water related to commercial 
losses. As a result also water conservation is likely to be undermined. Yepes 
(Franceys and Bos, ed; 2003) argues that a highly differentiated tariff encourage 
corruption as users seek to be classified in a lower tariff group. 
Whereas cross subsidies may provide disincentives to serve the poor well 
focused, government subsidies can provide clear incentives for utilities to do so.  The 
bottom line is not to lose any revenue by serving the poor, as tariffs for everyone, 
including the poor, are set on a realistic base. This could mean that economic and 
operational issues have to be separated from social and distributive issues.  
 
Sixth issue: Importance of contractual obligations including coverage targets. 
Direct providers must have clear time-bound targets to achieve universal coverage 
(Tynan, 2000). A rewarding system should be established for stakeholders who are 
successful in reaching targets, whether they are public or private and there should be 
penalties for failing to achieve the target.  The study on incentives to serve the poor 
shows an advantage that private providers have compared to public providers. The 
private providers have contractual incentives coupled with their motivation and 
willingness to be innovative and flexible in searching for ways to solve the provision 
problems. They have to solve these problems otherwise there will be penalties for 
failing to achieve the target and this will result in, for example, contract penalties / 
fines. Although a regulator stipulates responsibilities and what the contract should 
achieve it should not regulate how this should be done.  
 
Although direct providers often fail in their provision to the poor, the poor still 
have to obtain water from somewhere, every day. This has been resolved in several 
ways - by neighbours on-selling water from their household taps, by vendors carrying 
water from distant standposts or illegal connections, and by tanker drivers sourcing 
from private boreholes or from illegally tapping the water mains. In these ways, local 
non-state providers (NSPs) have long been involved in meeting the water needs of the 
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urban poor but being informal they have often been ignored. If formal utilities cannot 
overcome the resource constraints and disincentives outlined above, and given the 
large role NSPs play in service provision to the poor currently, then more effective 
ways of NSP engagement should be pursued. 
 
Types of Non-State Providers in the Water Sector 
A formal utility typically has a bulk supply and a limited water distribution network 
that do not reach many areas of a city/town and in particular the poor areas. Non-state 
providers (NSPs) provide water in these city/towns or neighbourhoods that are un-
served or poorly served by the formal utility. NSPs in water services can be divided 
into three broad types that reflect the main types of activity undertaken, namely: 
 
1. the informal private providers,  
2. civil society organisations supporting community based management, and  
3. private operators as part of public-private partnerships.  
 
Each category tends to be very different in the types of service they deliver and in the 
characteristics and ethos of their organisations.   
 
1. Informal private providers in the water sector. 
In many low-income areas in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, people do not have their 
own utility piped water connection and rely on water obtained from NSPs.  A study of 
ten cities in Africa (Collignon and Vézina, 2000) reported an average of 47 percent of 
households used small water providers or traditional sources such as dug wells, as 
their main sources of water.  NSPs in a number of South East Asian cities serve 
between 20 to 45 percent of households (McIntosh, 2003). Water sector informal 
private providers can be divided into two distinct types: (WUP, 2003 and Moran and 
Batley, 2004) 
 
• Independent Water Service Providers are not connected to the utility pipe 
network and may even compete with it.  They generally obtain their water 
from alternative sources such as their own borewells, then distribute through a 
pipe network, or through carriers or a single supply point.  Many independent 
providers are unauthorised or unregulated.  Some of these independent service 
providers obtain water from unsafe sources such as unprotected springs and 
wells, which can present health risks for consumers.  
 
• Intermediate Water Service Providers include private providers or community 
based organisations, delivering water in unserved areas. Intermediate 
providers generally obtain water from the utility piped network and either (i) 
install and manage network extensions or water points in unserved areas, or 
(ii) buy, carry and deliver water direct to customers willing to pay them (ibid).  
A wide variety of this type of NSP has emerged to fill specific market niches 
in urban water supply. They include: Resellers of home water (informal 
standpipes), standpipe or water kiosk operators, water carriers and carters, 
watertankers, and local sub-network providers.  
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2. Civil society organisations supporting community management 
A wide variety of civil society organisations operate in developing countries who are 
committed to participatory ways of working on water sector and/or multi-sector 
programmes including the following:  
• International NGOs who tend to work with local NGOs and CBOs and often 
also engage in policy dialogue.  
• Local NGOs in various forms such as faith based organisations and groups 
who have a particular ethos or defined ways of working; who usually work 
with CBOs and may engage in policy dialogue with government. 
• Local NGO umbrella organisations who can enable networking, lesson 
learning and can provide a platform for advocacy or representing the views of 
CBOs. 
• Community Based Organisations (CBOs) who seek to develop and perhaps 
manage water services in their communities in conjunction with other 
stakeholders such as NGOs and government, or they may do other activities 
on a self-help basis. 
• CBO federations who can enable networking, lesson learning and can provide 
a platform for ‘consumer voice’. 
 
3. Public Private Partnership contracts 
During the 1990s up to around 2002 there was a trend of increasing use of long-term 
public-private-partnership (PPP) contracts such as lease, and concession contracts for 
the management of urban water services in developing countries.  This occurred in 
Latin America, Africa and East Asia.  Many of the contracts have little or no 
provisions for serving the poor, which is a matter of concern to many stakeholders 
who question the priorities of the private operators.  There have, however, been some 
good examples of private operators using participatory approaches, often together 
with NGOs, to serve low income areas with a range of service and payment options.  
In the period 2000 to 2003 there were some high profile failures of large PPP 
contracts such as the concession contract in Buenos Aires, which occurred due to the 
local financial crisis. This has led the main private international operators in the water 
sector to be much less willing to take on the substantial commercial risks in low 
income countries. If there is to be less participation by the international private water 
operators in the long term management of urban water services in low income 
countries, then the local private sector, when enabled, is likely to play a larger role in 
the sector. Therefore the remaining of this paper focuses on government engagement 
of local private sector. 
 
Well known examples of NSP’s include2: water kiosk or standpipe vendors which are 
managed by private sellers or community groups to sell water by the container. This is 
a convenient option for people who do not have a connection, although expensive 
because of the need to pay for somebody to sell the water by the container. Another 
good option for people who do not have a connection (provided that disputes can be 
managed) is selling piped water to neighbours from yard taps or flexible pipes. A 
private or community managed pipe network can often be found in informal 
                                                          
2 Derived from Collignon and Vezina (2000) and Lyonnaise des Eaux (1998) 
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settlements. This is a solution in areas where utility are not willing or able to work. 
Unit costs per volume are generally less than, for example, water bought by water 
trucks or tankers. These sell water to distributing vendors or direct to consumers and 
can be a suitable option where larger quantities of water are required for un-served 
areas. As indicated this is much more expensive than piped water. Another generally 
expensive option is the water carriers who carry water by hand, cycles or carts. They 
sell water directly to consumers at or near their homes. This is a suitable option where 
access is a problem.  
 
Utility Engagement with Non-State Water Service Providers 
As utilities are not able to serve the poor at present state there is significant scope for 
productive engagement between utilities and NSPs. This section outlines how 
effective NSP engagements can address issues that hampering service provision to the 
poor by the formal utilities. 
 
Mandate, creativity and price 
Although the informal water providers do not have the mandate to serve the poor 
areas they are especially inclined to proliferate in (un-serviced) informal areas due to 
there commercially oriented nature and the fact that they are less encumbered by 
bureaucracy than the public sector. In general terms, the informal private sector is 
more flexible in their operations and more responsive to consumer need. They 
respond to the needs of the market by accessing high population density communities 
through the provision of different service options (Collignon and Vezina, 2000). They 
have shown remarkable resourcefulness in finding simple, but effective, solutions 
often under the most adverse operating conditions (WSP, 2005)  
However, also with provision through informal service providers the poor pay a 
price for this. In many places informal water providers face higher water tariffs than 
households with standard connections. Commercial tariffs are often higher than 
household tariffs, and increasing block tariffs punish households reselling water. Water 
tariffs often result in middle-income households with water connections paying less for 
water than do the vendors who supply low-income households (Kjellen and 
MCGranahan, 2006). If there is sufficient water being made available at the official tariff, 
and informal water providers are not cooperating to keep up the price of water, reducing 
water tariffs for informal water providers can be a straightforward means of assisting 
those who depend on these – often, among the poorest groups (Ibid). 
NSPs with civil society organisations can have similar outputs in terms of 
mandate and creativity as the formal water providers and can deliver service where 
the formal utility is unable or unwilling to serve (DFID, 1995). In addition, they can 
be effective in participatory projects where community groups in poor urban areas are 
mobilised to contribute to the decision-making. This is often initially effective on 
water programmes and particularly true where the process is facilitated by an able 
intermediary such as an NGO.  There are concerns, however, about the longer-term 
sustainable management of services including operations, maintenance and cost 
recovery of schemes run by civil society. In certain cases there seems to be a lack of 
incentives for community groups to continue with activities, particularly where the 
community groups are reliant on voluntary inputs from its members.  
 
Schouten and Moriarty (2003) argue that community management needs an enabling 
framework of technical support, policies and laws in which to be implemented. 
Agreement on the distribution of roles between government, utility, community 
groups and other stakeholders is required to develop sustainable services. More 
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sustainable arrangements often occur where the government or a utility has more of a 
direct contractual relationship with the community group and payments are made for 
services provided. 
In assessing the comparative advantage of NSPs though informal providers 
there needs to be looked at the costs of service provision. In terms of value for money 
those service providers who expend the least time, expense and effort to transport a 
given quantity of water are generally the most cost effective.  This invariably means 
that large piped water networks with high densities of paying customers tend to 
provide the most value for money.  Public water utilities can support such informal 
private providers by extending the piped water network closer to the customers of the 
NSPs and providing suitable water collection points. These NSPs will then not need to 
transport their water so far and can reduce the prices charged to their customers. 
 
Separation of provider and government; contracts and regulation 
Separation of responsibilities between provider and regulator, through regulation and 
contracts, is likely to increase possibilities for provision of incentives to serve the 
poor. Where NSP services are procured through formal contracts they are usually able 
to respond better to incentives for improving performance because of their inherent 
flexibility and the competition incentives.  
Different forms of NSPs require different types of contracts. Licensed water on 
sellers or standpipe public/private vendors have some form of contract and may operate 
standpipes built by government (see box 1). The contract may specify resale prices, hours 
of operation, terms of payment and conditions of rescinding the contract, although actual 
practices often deviate from the written terms (Kjellen and MCGranahan, 2006). The 
wholesale price (of water purchased by resellers from the utility) may be different from 
that of consumer households. In some places, resale prices are regulated, but difficult to 
control (Ibid).  
 
Box 1: Licensed standpipe operators in Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) 
 
Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, has a network of close to 500 standpipes. Most of these are 
located in peri-urban areas and at the entry of unplanned settlements. They constitute an 
important source for the public, as there are few alternatives. In order to be selected to manage a 
standpipe, one must deposit CFAF 30,000 and sign a contract with the National Water and 
Sanitation Office (ONEA). Standpipe operators buy water for CFAF 187/m3 and sell it at CFAF 
300/m3. Average monthly sales are in the area of CFAF 360,000, or 30–50 m3/day. Operations 
are closely supervised by ONEA, and any deviation from contract conditions can lead to the 
reassignment of the standpipe to another manager. There is an association of standpipe 
managers that seeks to bring common concerns to the attention of ONEA. Such concerns 
include improved transparency in the selection of standpipe managers.  
 
Source: Water Utility Partnership (2001–2003) Toolkit. A Practitioner's Companion. Case Examples: 
Standpipe Operators, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. (In: Kjellen and MCGranahan, 2006) 
 
The regulation of smaller NSPs such as informal private providers and community 
groups in the water sector presents challenges due to their small scale and informal 
characteristics.  NSPs such as water vendors often charge high water prices, so it is 
tempting for formal utilities to try and regulate their prices (economic regulation).   
‘Principal-Agent’ theory examines organizational relationships as a tension 
between the ‘principal’ who demands a service and an ‘agent’ who provides it.  The 
likelihood of the principal (such as the utility) effectively controlling an agent (such 
as an NSP)  depends on: 
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• how much information the principal has about the performance of the agent; 
and 
• how far the principal can structure the relationship so as to make the agent’s 
interests or objectives correspond to the principal’s  (Batley and Larbi, 2004) 
In the case of regulation of a large private water utility, the principal is potentially 
able to effectively structure the relationship with the agent (operator) to achieve their 
objectives, through a carefully designed contract and good contract management. 
However, in the case of a utility that wishes to engage or control informal water 
providers, there is much less scope for the utility to control their work. This is because 
of the diverse, small and informal nature of the activities of NSPs such as water 
carriers. It would be impractical for a regulator to take into account the varying costs 
of a wide range of water NSPs in a city and then regulate those NSPs on a fair basis.  
Economic regulation of smaller informal NSPs is unlikely to be an efficient use of 
resources and it could even be counterproductive as standards are set too high, the net 
result could be smaller quantities of water with an even lower standard on a ‘black 
market’ (Kjellen and MCGranahan, 2006).   
 
Other, more market friendly and supportive forms of regulation such as regulation 
minimum service quality levels, regulation of market entry, and publicising NSP 
performance and costs. For example, Tremolet and Browning (2002) propose making 
data on the performance of providers publicly available, thus relying on the regulating 
effects of reputation.  For example, a utility or the regulator can publicise the price of 
water that the vendors pay at the location where they collect their water, so that 
customers can see the price mark-up when water is sold to them.  This approach 
operates as a form of price regulation by making information about service 
performance transparent.   
Although contractual arrangements between utilities and NSPs are starting to 
occur, there are many utilities that have yet to formally engage with NSPs. 
Recognising NSPs in provision of water services can build trust and accountability. 
Utility engagement could, for example, start by encouraging non-interference in 
acceptable NSP activities and having some limited formal recognition of NSPs. 
Interests of customers, NSPs and utilities may potentially be better resolved through 
open dialogue and official recognition of roles and responsibilities and it may also 
improve the legal protection of NSPs and their equipment against corrupt, 
discriminatory or arbitrary practices on behalf of different authorities (Kjellen and 
MCGranahan, 2006).If utilities want to support and enhance the services provided by 
NSPs and the public sector, then more substantial forms of engagement could be 
considered, such as registration of NSPs, and formal legal registrations to provide 
services. If these types of activities are done well, synergies can be achieved through 
collaboration between utility and NSPs.  Successful utility/ NSP relationships often 
entail a number of different forms of engagement such as dialogue, collaboration, 
contracting and market friendly regulation. 
 
Challenges to reach the poor 
There are clear challenges for utilities intending to work with NSPs, even in 
more stable environments, not least of which is the institutional congruity between 
bureaucratic agencies and the more informal NSPs. In addition there is a challenge in 
the fact that utility engagement with NSPs can be perceived as contradicting. For 
utility to have a positive attitude towards NSPs might be seen as allowing a situation 
in which the poor pay the most. When utilitys have a negative outlook on NSPs, in 
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particular the informal private providers) and enforce legislation, this could result in 
reduction of available water and higher the prices for the poorest segment of the 
population. (Kjellen and MCGranahan, 2006). It can also not be assumed that NSPs 
and/or utility staff want to engage with each other. Table 1 highlights such factors for 
that need to be considered when contemplating better engagement. As donors and 
governments seek to encourage public water sector agencies to engage more 
productively with different types of NSPs, they need to be mindful of the perceived 
incentives and disincentives that utility staff and NSPs may have. 
 
Table 1 – Incentives for productive engagement with informal water NSPs 
 
Incentives for productive engagement Disincentives for productive engagement 
NSP’s perspective Utility’s perspective NSP’s perspective Utility staff’s 
perspective 
1. Formal recognition 
and engagement can 
provide some security 
for the NSP’s 
operations and some 
protection for their 
investments.  
1. Effective 
collaboration can lead 
to win-win agreements 
that enable improved or 
cheaper services for 
consumers. 
1. Formal recognition 
and engagement with 
utility could lead to 
increased NSPs costs 
such as taxes or new 
technical requirements. 
1.  Utility staff are 
often reluctant to 
engage with informal 
or illegal service 
providers, who are 
seen as unqualified 
competitors. 
 
2.  Opportunities for 
expansion of NSP 
services in conjunction 
with utility. 
2.  If utility 
facilitate/support 
improved NSP services, 
then they can claim 
some of the credit. 
2.  Some Informal 
NSPs may not have the 
resources or skills to 
meet utility 
requirements. 
2. Some staff may be 
concerned about 
reduced informal 
payments that they 
receive, if interactions 
are more transparent. 
3.  If NSPs are able to 
improve their services 
as a result of working 
with utility, NSP 
customers are likely to 
be more satisfied and 
loyal. 
3.  NSPs who use utility 
water without paying 
can be encouraged to 
pay for their water. 
3. In fragile states 
NSPs may be reluctant 
to engage with utility 
for fear of getting 
drawn into political 
strife or conflict. 
3. Engaging with so 
many small informal 
NSPs who have a 
different work culture, 
may not be considered 
feasible. 
4. If some targeted 
finance is provided by 
utility or donors to 
improve NSP services, 
NSPs and their 
customers can benefit. 
4. Recognising and 
working with NSPs 
means that public 
agencies can focus on 
achievable public sector 
service improvements. 
  
 
Utility engagement with NSPs should be carefully guided. Where there is a 
shared understanding between utilities and NSPs about the working environment and 
incentives of both parties, there are much better prospects for effective partnerships 
and win-win situations emerging. Collignon and Plummer (2005) highlight a number 
of issues to be addressed to enable better utility engagement with local informal water 
private providers:  
• Reconciling informality with conventional procedures. Most small operators 
are informal, impossible to contract, and difficult to monitor. Identifying 
mechanisms to overcome the incompatibility of informal business practice 
and formal procedures is essential if providers and utilities/municipalities are 
to work together.  
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• Sharing the market. Water utilities typically capture the market through their 
monopoly status and officials are concerned that formal revenues and 
informal payments will decline with more recognition of local providers. 
Evidence in a number of utilities suggests however that bulk supply contracts 
with NSPs can result in win-win agreements with businesses and provide an 
incentive for both to share the market.  
• Changing attitudes. Officials do not understand local private operators' 
working methods, the logic of their business or the rules of the informal 
market, and they do not have skills to work with these operators.  
Unsurprisingly there is often a deep mistrust between technocrats and the 
local entrepreneurs. 
Similar challenges also apply to government working with civil society organisations 
which also are perceived to have an informal style of working.   
 
Conclusions 
In a resource limited situation in low income countries both formal utilities 
and NSPs have their comparative advantages and weaknesses in providing water 
services to the poor. At present formal utilities have no mandate or contractual 
obligations to serve the poor, they cannot be creative in serving the poor as there is a 
lack of managerial autonomy to search for appropriate solutions. Experience shows 
that governments play a large role in regulating meaningful subsidy schemes. 
Separation of the government and the service provider is necessary to prevent poacher 
– gamekeeper situations. Service provision by the formal utility may be desired (due 
to economies of scale), effective engagement between utility and NSPs is increasingly 
seen as a solution as NSPs are out there serving the poor and overcoming some of the 
obstacles faced by the formal utilities. However, this has a price. This price is paid by 
the poor!  
 
Successful utility / NSP engagements can take different forms such as dialogue, 
collaboration, contracting and market friendly regulations. There are clear challenges 
that should be addressed while pursuing productive engagements between utilities and 
NSPs. Institutional congruity between bureaucratic and informal organisations 
provides a challenge as informality should be reconciled with conventional 
procedures.  Utility staff and NSPs may have perceived incentives or disincentives 
what the engagement could bring them and this requires a change in attitude. Lastly, 
formal utilities should be willing to share their market, as formal revenues and 
informal payments may decline with the recognition of NSPs 
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